


~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DCI/ICS 0951-87/1



29 October 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Officer
Office of Security

25X1 FROM: [redacted]

Community Counterintelligence and Security
Countermeasures Office, IC Staff

25X1 SUBJECT: Security Support to the House of Representatives [redacted]

25X1 REFERENCE: Telecon, [redacted] dtd 29 Oct 87

1. Attached are documents providing the background for this matter which requires CIA to provide security support to the House of Representatives. The SIG-I structure will be the organizational element driving this action. OS/CIA should be prepared to provide at least two persons to participate in this activity. One person, coming from under the IG/CM(P) umbrella, would be the "expert" to provide guidance relative to SCI material stored, produced, and processed in the House and Armed Services Committee. The other person, coming from under the IG/CM(T) umbrella, would be a TSCM specialist. [redacted]

25X1 2. [redacted] had alerted [redacted] some time ago about the possibility of
25X1 tasking for his organization. I had informed [redacted] in a preliminary
25X1 way by sending him a MFR on this matter. As this has developed, in keeping
25X1 with the concept of Community participation, we will need two persons from CIA
because of the division of labor. The Technical Directorate is well attuned
to the House profile by virtue of the Capitol Hill Advisory Committee (CHAC)
under nominal leadership of FBI but substantively manned by CIA and NSA for
the TSCM activities. On the other side, the Personnel Directorate is a
natural participant due to Agency responsibility for SCI matters on the Hill.
Specifically, [redacted] would be the most logical source of
guidance in that arena. [redacted]

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25X1

SUBJECT: Security Support to the House of Representatives



3. Art Fajans, the Working Group leader, would like to hold a preliminary, organizational meeting here in our CCISCMO conference room 1015 in Ames Building on 6 November. With your approval, I would like to make contact directly with [redacted] to confirm the names of their respective participants. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

25X1



Attachments:
a/s

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25X1 SUBJECT: Security Support to the House of Representatives

25X1 CCISCMO/ICS

Distribution:

Original - Addressee (w/att)
1 - C/PASG (w/att)
1 - DD/P&TS (w/att)
1 - CM chrono (wo/att)
1 - Subject file (wo/att)

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24 OCT 1987

DCI/ICS 0951-87/1
20 October 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
Acting Director, Intelligence Community Staff

STAT

FROM: 
Director, Community Counterintelligence and Security
Countermeasures Office, IC Staff


SUBJECT: Proposed DCI Response to the Speaker of the House's Request
for Security Assistance

1. This memorandum recommends that you sign the attached letter to the Speaker of the House. The Speaker's request has been expected for some time and follows several conversations between Mr. Latimer, Staff Director, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, and members of the IC Staff and Mr. Art Fajans of Department of Defense. At the last such meeting, Mr. Latimer (and associates from Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs) was informed that the Community is prepared to offer any assistance that is explicitly requested. The Speaker's letter is the resulting request.

2. The proposed response was passed to Mr. Alderman, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, through Mr. Art Fajans (mentioned in paragraph two of the attached response). Mr. Alderman orally concurred in the proposed response on 19 October 1987.

3. Mr. Fajans has been making tentative arrangements to collect his team, subject to your formal approval of a response.

STAT



FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

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SUBJECT: Proposed DCI Response to the Speaker of the House's Request for
Security Assistance

STAT D/CCISCMO/ICS:amd: (20 October 1987)

Distribution of DCI/ICS 0951-87/1:

Original - Addressee
1 - Mr. Craig Alderman
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - OCA
1 - D/ICS and DD/ICS
1 - LL/ICS
1 - ICS Registry
1 - CCISCMO subject
1 - CCISCMO chrono
1 - CM chrono

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The Director of Central Intelligence

Washington, D.C. 20505

DCI/ICS 0951-87

26 OCT 1987

The Honorable James C. Wright, Jr.
The Speaker of the House
US House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

This letter acknowledges your 1 October 1987 request for expert advice in preparing recommendations to establish uniform standards of information security for the House of Representatives. It also serves to affirm my agreement to support the action you have requested.

Mr. Craig Alderman, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, as Chairman of the Interagency Group/Countermeasures (Policy), will be responsible for assigning full Intelligence Community participation in acting on your request. He has designated Mr. Arthur Fajans of his office as leader of the team of security experts now being assembled. Mr. Fajans has held an exploratory meeting with certain key Committee Staff leaders and will, unless otherwise advised, interact with Mr. Thomas K. Latimer, Staff Director, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, as his primary point of contact.

The Intelligence Community welcomes the opportunity to offer advice and guidance as part of our mutual, continuing effort to improve the security posture of the entire Federal Government.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ William H. Webster
William H. Webster

cc: Mr. Craig Alderman

SUBJECT: Letter to Speaker Wright

STAT D/CCISCMO/ICS:amd: (19 October 1987)

Distribution of DCI/ICS 0951-87:

Original - Addressee
1 - Mr. Craig Alderman
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - OCA
1 - D/ICS and DD/ICS
1 - LL/ICS
1 - ICS Registry
1 - CCISCMO subject
1 - CCISCMO chrono
1 - CM chrono

The Speaker's Rooms
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

October 1, 1987

Honorable William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

Dear Judge Webster:

Bob Michel and I have asked the chairmen and ranking members of the Foreign Affairs, Appropriations, Armed Services and Intelligence Committees to provide us recommendations about establishing uniform standards of information security for the House of Representatives.

It would be helpful if you would make available to those chairmen and ranking members such expert advice as they may require in drafting such recommendations.

I would appreciate your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,



Jim Wright
The Speaker

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2 October 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

25X1 FROM: [REDACTED]
25X1 SUBJECT: Security Support to HPSCI [REDACTED]

25X1 1. On 1 October Art Fajans came to our offices to confer with D/CCISCMO, [REDACTED] and the undersigned. He brought with him a copy of a memo he prepared for Mr. Alderman (attached) which chronicled events from Mr. Fajan's perspective and outlined the tasking agreed upon in the 29 September meeting at HPSCI. Mr. Fajans then offered his plans for proceeding with necessary
25X1 actions. [REDACTED]

25X1 2. Mr. Fajans intends to brief Mr. Alderman on 5 October to get his approval to move forward. Fortunately, Fajans has a draft HR prepared two years ago by OSD (Britt Snider) that contains the bulk of what Fajans would propose to submit for this effort in providing the House with minimum standards for protection of classified (collateral) information. Fajans thought he could do most of the revision and refinement on that product himself. Next, he would like to call together members of his working group for the comprehensive survey of Armed Services Committee. He tentatively
25X1 chose 8 or 9 October for that meeting, using our CCISCMO conference room. [REDACTED]

3. Once Fajans gets Mr. Alderman's approval to proceed with his plans, he will likely ask us to make telephone calls to IG/CM(P) principals for commitment of a security officer for the working group. Fajans has accepted our proposed alignment of agencies/departments for assignment to work the disciplines as:

Information Security IS00
OPSEC/CI FBI
Personnel Security DoD

Technical/SCI CIA
COMPSEC/COMPUSEC NSA
Physical Security DoE

25X1



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25X1

SUBJECT: Security Support to HPSCI []

25X1

Fajans will be overseas on TDY 11-17 October and it is hoped that the memoranda from the House requesting the above actions will have been received by the time he returns so work can begin. []

25X1

4. Fajans intends to use our conference room for a working area and meeting place during this effort. He asked that CCISCMO be a reviewing element of his products, to which we agreed. We will also provide limited secretarial support as offered earlier. []

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

5. The mechanism for getting the IG/CM(T) into the loop was discussed with Fajans. [] had explained the Hill technical security support system as he knew it to be practiced, outlining the participation of NSA, FBI, Secret Service, and CHAP roles, formal and informal. Fajans asked Al to draw up a short paper explaining it in writing. Al will accomplish this. It was suggested that Mr. Alderman inform [] IG/CM(T), of the events that have taken place and the requirement for use of agency personnel for disciplines under the IG/CM(T) umbrella. It was suggested that [] would then alert [] to their supporting roles. This would effectively cover the TSCM, COMSEC, COMPUSEC, and TEMPEST requirements. []

25X1

6. Fajans intends to again meet with Steve Garfinkel and ask for his review and comments on the draft HR that he has and ask for any new ideas for incorporation in the paper. He will also ask that an ISOO person be identified to participate in the working group. Fajans thought he would ask Mr. Alderman to announce this effort at the next IG/CM(P) meeting and simultaneously request participating agencies to report to Fajans on the mechanical means whereby classified information was transmitted to the House and where it was sent. []

25X1

25X1

7. The next event in this matter will be notification to us of the results of Fajans' meeting with Mr. Alderman and further actions will be guided by those results. []

Attachment:
a/s

2
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Page Denied

Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied

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DCI/ICS 0924-87
20 August 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with HPSCI Staff Director, 14 August 1987

1. On 14 August 1987 the Acting Director/CCISCMO, [redacted] and two staff members, Messrs. [redacted] met with the Staff Director of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI), Mr. Thomas Latimer. This meeting was requested by Mr. Latimer, and the subject of the meeting, although thought to generally relate to security, was unknown to the CCISCMO members. D/CCISCMO, D/ICS, and LL/ICS were given a "heads up" prior to the meeting. [redacted]

2. Mr. Latimer explained that the purpose of the meeting was to express his concerns over the general state of security in the House and to seek assistance from the Intelligence Community to address the perceived poor situation. The bottom line is that he wants help to perform a comprehensive survey of the security practices and procedures as they now exist, identify the shortcomings/deficiencies relative to executive branch standards, and recommend necessary improvements (within parameters acceptable to the Speaker). The qualifier means that what actually needs to be done may not be acceptable to the Speaker and/or members and may require some negotiated "other means" to achieve a desired level of security. He spoke in terms of convenience, efficiency, existing perks, space, staffing, and lack of organizational structure. While Mr. Latimer was concerned about the House as a whole, he was particularly concerned about the major committees that handle the bulk of the classified materials. The greatest interest concerned the HPSCI, Armed Services Committee, Appropriations Committee, and Foreign Affairs Committee, with perhaps others as appropriate. [redacted]

3. Mr. Latimer explained that he and the Chairman had made several improvements to strengthen the security procedures for HPSCI, and he provided a copy of the SOP developed and used by the Foreign Affairs Committee. He then proceeded to give examples of several things he was particularly concerned about:

- a. Clearances: All staff members who have access to classified material should have a background investigation. He is concerned that personal staffers (no clearances) are exposed to classified conversations

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25X1 SUBJECT: Meeting with HPSCI Staff Director, 14 August 1987 []

25X1 and materials. Members are not always sure who is cleared for what and what they can discuss where. He was also concerned that the Capitol Police assigned to the Hill lacked continuity because of quick rotation and turn-around of personnel. He was unsure of who cleared the Capitol Police and for what level. Perhaps some should have access to SCI. Apparently, some years ago there was a select group of Capitol Police permanently assigned to the Hill. The current policy is to rotate the assignment throughout the work force. According to Latimer, the lack of stability and continuity thus created should be corrected. []

25X1 b. Document Control: Except for the HPSCI and Foreign Affairs Committees, document control seems to be a sometime thing. Basically, there is no central control, and the committees are left to their own devices. This is further complicated because organizations such as GSA, DoJ, and others continue to deliver classified materials directly to the members rather than to the Intelligence Committee. This provides the opportunity for material to receive less-than-adequate protection. According to Latimer, HPSCI provides strict control and accountability for its classified material. []

25X1 c. Organization: There is apparently no established organizational structure to support a formal security program. As an example, the Speaker could probably designate the Sergeant-at-Arms to manage physical security. Mr. Latimer serves as the Security Officer of the HPSCI as an additional duty. []

25X1 d. Security Education/Awareness: There appears to be a general lack of an effective security awareness program. Members and staff are frequently uncertain on exactly what is classified/sensitive and what protection is required. This is further complicated by the apparent lack of paragraph/document markings and the failure of briefers to properly identify the sensitivity of materials presented to members and staff. []

25X1 e. Technical Security: HPSCI has a screen room and processes all material on TEMPEST-approved equipment. Additionally, they have strict control over reproduction equipment. It appears that other committees take the precaution of requiring a technical sweep prior to conducting closed hearings or meetings but continue to process the resulting transcripts on unprotected equipment. Mr. Latimer touched briefly on the probable use of uncleared/unknown char force and equipment/facility maintenance personnel []

4. The SSCI report, "Meeting the Espionage Challenge: A Review of United States Counterintelligence and Security Programs," dated 7 October 1986 and the HPSCI report, "United States Counterintelligence and Security Concerns-1986," clearly indicate the desire and commitment of Congress to

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25X1 SUBJECT: Meeting with HPSCI Staff Director, 14 August 1987 []

25X1 improve its security posture. In response to these reports, the Intelligence Community is committed to provide assistance. The meeting on 14 August was exploratory in seeking IC assistance. Mr. Latimer referenced a survey that [] former Director of the Office of Security/CIA, had personally conducted on the Senate side about two years ago. It appears that a similar service is what Latimer has in mind, but he is receptive to IC judgment. At this point, it is informal and low key and will be driven by an acceptable proposal from the Intelligence Community. Once the plan is developed, Mr. Latimer will present it to the Speaker and appropriate leaders for approval/support. The survey will provide the basis for formal recommendations to enhance security. []

25X1 5. Off the top, a team of four specialists should be assembled to conduct the survey, and the four major areas of personnel, information, physical, and technical security should be addressed. Once we understand the current policies and procedures (or lack thereof), definitive recommendations can be formulated based on executive branch standards. I am inclined not to accept any limiting factors in the initial recommendations, but rather to address the optimum first. How the recommendations are implemented by the House is their decision. It seems natural that the SIG-I structure should be considered to undertake this project. Once that decision is made, a more definitive plan can be developed. []

25X1 6. D/ICS was briefed verbally (telephone) on 14 August 1987. []

25X1 []
CCISCMO/ICS

25X1 CCISCMO/ICS []

Distribution:

- Original - D/ICS (via EO/ICS and DD/ICS)
- 1 - LL/ICS
- 1 - ICS Registry
- 1 - CCICMO subject
- 1 - CCISCMO chrono

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30 September 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

25X1 FROM: [REDACTED]
Community Counterintelligence and Security
Countermeasures Office, IC Staff

25X1 SUBJECT: Security Support to HPSCI [REDACTED]

25X1 1. On 29 September 1987, [REDACTED] D/CCISCMO, Art Fajans, OSD, and the undersigned visited Staff Director Tom Latimer, HPSCI, in the HPSCI offices at the Capitol. The purpose of the meeting was to introduce Art Fajans as the officer designated by Chairman, IG/CM(P), with responsibility for organizing a team of interagency security specialists to assist HPSCI as required. The other purpose for the meeting was to learn from Mr Latimer just what security guidance and assistance was desired and in what depth and scope
25X1 the House leadership would expect the effort to be conducted. [REDACTED]

2. Mr. Latimer had invited other responsible House committee officers and those present were:

Fred Mohrman	Appropriations Committee--Staff Director
John Plashal	Appropriations Committee--Defense Subcommittee Staff Assistant
Bob Davis	Appropriations Committee--Defense Subcommittee Staff Assistant
Bill Hogan	Armed Services Committee--General Counsel
Peter Abbruzzese	Foreign Affairs Committee--Staff Consultant
Bob Jenkins	Foreign Affairs Committee--Minority Senior Staff Consultant [REDACTED]

25X1 3. [REDACTED] stated the background up to the time of the meeting, tracing how the original request for security support went informally to D/ICS and to DDCI and DCI for concept approval back through the SIG-I structure to the IG/CM(P) where working responsibility rests. Mr. Latimer introduced a letter (attached) from the House Speaker to Les Aspin, Chairman, Armed
25X1 [REDACTED]

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TAB B

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25X1 SUBJECT: Security Support to HPSCI

25X1 Services Committee, asking that appropriate senior members of certain committees meet to consider establishing uniform security standards and regulations for management of classified information in the House. The letter referenced correspondence from Chairman, HPSCI, who originated the request for a task force to examine House committees and member offices to determine needs in formulating rules and standards on security.

25X1 4. Mr. Fajans expressed his intent to gather whatever resources were necessary to provide security advice and guidance to the House as required. He stated only that he needed to know specifically what the requirements were. Some specific (ACM, emanations) and some general security topics were iterated. Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) and TEMPEST inspections were suggested by the House personnel. Also mentioned was the matter of Capitol Police personnel being utilized along with Committee security officers in more expanded roles which led to the matter of training in security disciplines. The availability of training at the Defense Security Institute, Richmond, Virginia was surfaced and the House personnel seemed to favor that for selected personnel.

25X1 5. Some dialogue followed regarding the applicability of a security survey in various Committees and it was soon evident that in-depth surveys were not desired. An exception was Armed Services Committee. Mr. Hogan said he wanted a comprehensive security survey to cover all aspects of his Committee's operations. It was then agreed that a paper should be prepared which would provide the Executive Branch guidelines, regulations, and standards for the protection of collateral classified information which the House could review, accept, and possibly develop into a House Resolution.

6. In concluding the meeting, the points and actions agreed upon were the following:

- o General and specific security advice, guidance, and support will be rendered using interagency assets through the SIG/I structure.
- o An interagency team, headed by Art Fajans of OSD will make available Executive Branch guidelines, rules, and standards pertaining to security protection of collateral classified information. (SCI is managed separately under CIA cognizance.)
- o Mr. Fajans will manage and direct an interagency-staffed team of specialists to conduct a comprehensive security survey of the Armed Services Committee. Recommendations will be offered to bring that body into conformity with regulations and standards established for the protection of classified information.
- o Mr. Latimer will arrange for transmittal of a letter from the Speaker of the House to the DCI requesting the Executive Branch security

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25X1

SUBJECT: Security Support to HPSCI

guidelines, regulations, standards, and procedures for protection of classified information. (These could later take the form of a House Resolution after acceptance by the House membership.)

25X1

- o Mr. Hogan will arrange for a similar letter requesting a comprehensive security survey of the Armed Services Committee.

7. Mr. Latimer was asked if there was any deadline or urgency attached to the proposed actions. He answered saying while timing was not critical, he would like to move ahead on this since the letter from the Speaker which initiated the matter was written in June 1987. Mr. Fajans responded by saying now that he knew what was required, he thought actions could be completed within a reasonable time.

25X1

25X1



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The Speaker's Rooms
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515
June 8, 1987

Hon. Les Aspin
U.S. House of Representatives
2336 Rayburn
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Les:

We have received a letter from Chairman Louis Stokes and ranking member Henry Hyde, requesting that we "form a task force to look at security of all House Committees and Member offices and to make recommendations based on that survey for uniform standards and regulations involving the security of classified information." We have attached a copy of the Stokes-Hyde letter.

We would very much appreciate it if the chairmen and ranking members of Foreign Affairs, Appropriations, Armed Services, and Intelligence would meet as soon as conveniently possible and, after discussion, report to us with recommendations concerning the important issues and necessary questions that have to be raised about the issue of uniform standards of security for the House. Once we have those guidelines, we can proceed to come up with suggestions for possible legislation in this area.

We thank you for taking the time out of your busy schedule to advise us on this issue.

Sincerely,



Jim Wright
The Speaker



Bob Michel
Republican Leader

cc: Hon. Louis Stokes
Hon. Henry Hyde

TAB C

H. RES _____

A RESOLUTION to provide minimum uniform standards for the protection of information classified in the interests of national security which is in the control and custody of a Committee of the House of Representatives, or any Member thereof.

WHEREAS, information which is classified in the interests of national security may, if improperly disclosed, cause damage to the national security;

WHEREAS, such information is provided on a recurring and frequent basis to Committees of the House of Representatives, and Members thereof, by departments and agencies of the Executive branch of government, and is utilized in various ways by such Committees and Members;

WHEREAS, there are no statutory or congressional policies in existence which provide a uniform degree of protection for such information under the custody or control of the House of Representatives, including Committees and Members thereof,

BE IT THEREFORE RESOLVED, THAT---

Sec. 1. Access to classified information shall be limited to Members, and those of their staffs who have, after appropriate investigation or inquiry, been determined to be trustworthy and to have a need for such access in order to perform their official duties. Requests for such investigations or inquiries shall be made to the department or agency of the Executive branch, whose information is required to be accessed by the staff member concerned. Results of these investigations or inquiries, together with a recommendation whether the staff

TAB D

member concerned should be granted a clearance, shall be provided the Member, or where staff of a Committee is concerned, the Chairman, who shall make a final determination with respect to such clearance. Such determination shall be based upon a finding that access by the individual concerned to classified information is clearly consistent with the national security, and, if the decision is contrary to the recommendation of the Executive branch department or agency concerned, consultations with such department or agency. All clearance determinations shall be reported to the Sergeant-at-Arms who shall be responsible for maintaining a current listing of all security clearances issued pursuant to this section.

Sec. 2. The Sergeant-at-Arms shall also ensure that all persons who are granted security clearances are briefed initially and periodically thereafter regarding their responsibilities to protect classified information, including the requirements of this Rule.

Sec 3. The classifications assigned by departments and agencies of the Executive branch to information provided to Committees of the House of Representatives, or Members thereof, shall be carried over to any documents originated by such Committees or such Members, or their respective staffs, which are derived from or contain such classified information; provided, however, that any classification assigned by a department or agency of the Executive branch which is believed by the recipient Committee or Member to have been improperly classified shall be reported immediately to the department or agency

concerned, and an explanation of continuing such classification required. Where agreement cannot be reached with the responsible department or agency in terms of the propriety of the classification assigned, the matter shall be referred to (if not already being addressed by) the Committee with primary jurisdiction over the department or agency involved, which shall attempt to resolve the disagreement. When such Committee determines, however, that the information in question is improperly classified and should be released to the public, it shall follow the procedures set forth in section 7 of Rule XLVII of the Rules of the House of Representatives (as applicable to the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence) prior to authorizing such release.

Sec. 4. Classified information shall be stored when not in use in safes approved for this purpose by the Sergeant-at-Arms, which shall be comparable in quality to the storage containers required by the Executive branch.

Sec. 5. Access to classified information shall be limited to persons who have security clearances and a need to know such information in the performance of their official duties. All documents classified at the TOP SECRET level which are transmitted outside the office of a Committee or Member who receives it, shall be accounted for by a receipt signed by a representative of the receiving office. A log of all documents classified at the SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL level which are transmitted outside the office of a Committee or Member shall also be maintained, identifying the recipient.

Sec. 6. Classified information shall be processed,

reproduced, transmitted and destroyed only in accordance with procedures established by the Sergeant-at-Arms, which shall be designed to reasonably preclude access by unauthorized persons.

Sec. 7. Unauthorized disclosures of classified information in the control or custody of a Committee of the House, or any Member thereof, shall be reported to the Sergeant-at-Arms who shall conduct, as appropriate, investigations or inquiries into the circumstances. All such disclosures shall also be reported to the department or agency of the Executive branch which had provided the information subject to such disclosure.

Sec. 8. Any staff member of the House of Representatives determined to have knowingly and willfully violated any provision of this Rule, or the procedures established pursuant thereto, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action, which may include immediate suspension or termination of his or her security clearance by the Member or Chairman who granted such clearance. The Sergeant-at-Arms shall be advised of such action who, in turn, shall advise the department or agency that conducted the investigation or inquiry. Where violations of this rule also may constitute a violation of the criminal statutes of the United States, they shall be referred to the Department of Justice for appropriate action.